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Abstract
The philosophy of history is undergoing something of a revival. Much has happened 
since its heydays in the 1960s when methodological discussions concerning the struc-
ture of explanation in history and the natural sciences were central to the philosophi-
cal agenda. This introduction revisits Collingwood’s contribution to the philosophy of 
history, his views on the relation between science and history, and the possibility of 
historical knowledge suggesting his work is of enduring relevance to contemporary 
debates. It locates his contribution in the context of the hermeneutic tradition and 
locates his defence of the methodological autonomy of history in the context of recent 
debates concerning the relation between science and the history of the philosophy of 
science.
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In The Idea of History1 Collingwood set out to defend the claim that history is a 
Geisteswissenschaft or a science of the mind and that, as such, it is methodolog-
ically autonomous with respect to natural science. The claims that a) history is 
the study of mind and that b) it is methodologically autonomous with respect 
to natural science are closely connected because the consideration that his-
torians, unlike natural scientists, are concerned with the past rather than the 
future, is insufficient to show that history has a subject matter of its own. After 
all, the past is the concern of many other forms of inquiry, such as palaeontol-
ogy, forensic archaeology, and big-bang physics. For history to be autonomous 
it must have a subject matter that is not shared by natural science. History, 
Collinwood claims, does have its own distinctive subject matter, but it is its 
focus on actions, not the past, that accounts for its autonomous status. Actions 
constitute a genuinely distinctive historical subject matter because they can-
not be understood by the methods of natural science. They are understood, not 
when they are subsumed under empirical laws, but when they are rationalized 
and thus comprehended as an expression of thought. Nomological explana-
tions are suited to the investigation of events which, Collingwood claims, are 
the subject matter of the natural sciences, but actions must be understood in 
a different way, namely as expressions of thought, if they are to be understood 
at all. What makes history distinctive, therefore, is not that it studies the past 
per se, but that it studies it in a different way, as an expression of thought/mind. 
History is therefore a science of mind or Geisteswissenschaft and its distinctive 
method and subject matter are brought to the fore when they are contrasted 
with the method and subject matter of natural science.
The distinction between the subject matters of history and natural science 
(actions and events) is primarily a distinction between the forms of inference 
at work in the sciences of mind and nature. “Mind” or “action” is that which is 
investigated rationally by establishing conceptual rather than empirical con-
nections. “Nature” or “events” is that which is studied empirically, by the meth-
od of observation and inductive generalization. Biology, chemistry and physics 
are natural sciences to the extent that they operate in this way, notwithstanding 
the many other differences between them. The distinction between the ratio-
nalizing and nomological inferences at work in the sciences of mind and na-
ture respectively should not be hypostatized. The subject matter of history, for 
Collingwood, is not the human being strictly speaking, but human beings in so 
far as what they do is understood as actions or expressions of thought, through 
the deployment of rationalizing explanations. The distinction between the 
1   Collingwood, R. G., The Idea of History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1944); revised edition, with 
an introduction by Jan Van der Dussen (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993). Abbreviated 
as IH.
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study of mind and nature as Collingwood understands it runs deeper than the 
distinction between academic disciplines or subjects. In Collingwood’s view, 
for example, what would determine whether an archaeologist is a historian (in 
his sense of the term “history”) or a natural scientist, is the kind of questions 
which she is seeking answers to and the kind of inferences which are used to 
answer those questions. A forensic archaeologist making use of carbon-dating 
techniques would not be a historian, but a humanistically oriented archaeolo-
gist looking for rationalizing answers to a certain kind of (teleological) why-
question, would be. History understood as a Geisteswissenschaft or science of 
the mind cannot therefore be straightforwardly identified with the academic 
discipline taught in university departments. A subject matter is historical when 
it is understood through rationalizing rather than nomological inferences. In 
this sense “history” is found wherever rationalizing inferences are made.
Collingwood’s argument for the methodological autonomy of history, un-
derstood as the study of mind, has its roots in the view that explanation must 
be fit for purpose. Since the kind of questions asked by historians tend to be 
teleological in nature, why-questions, deployed in historical inquiry, instigate 
a search for goals which, when ascribed to agents, rationalize what happened 
and, in so doing, show what the point of their action was. The concept of expla-
nation with which historians work captures a distinctive sense of explanation 
according to which to make sense of an action requires ascribing the agent a 
practical argument in which the epistemic premise (the causa quod) and the 
motivational premise (the causa ut) rationalize (in a fairly anaemic sense of 
rationalize) what the agent did by showing it to be instrumental to the achieve-
ment of certain goals. (EM, 292). Answering the why-questions typically asked 
by historians, therefore, requires deploying explanations that are different in 
kind from the explanations which answer the sort of “why-questions” asked by 
scientists:
When a scientist asks “why did that piece of litmus paper turn pink?” he 
means “on what kind of occasions do pieces of litmus turn pink?” When 
an historian asks: “why did Brutus stab Caesar?” he means “what did 
Brutus think, which made him decide to stab Caesar?”
IH, 214
Different types of why-questions have their own corresponding sort of causal/
becausal answers or, in other words, their own kind of explanation.2 When an 
2   Collingwood, R. G. 1940. An Essay on Metaphysics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940), part III. 
Revised edition, with an introduction by Rex Martin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
Abbreviated as EM.
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engineer or car-mechanic wonders why an engine failed, they expect a certain 
type of answer, one which points out what can be changed to fix the problem. 
The kind of questions asked by engineers and car mechanics are the kind of 
why-questions that are answered by appealing to a conception of causation 
as a handle, which takes a cause to be “an event by producing or preventing 
which one can produce or prevent that whose cause it is said to be”.3 This ma-
nipulability conception of causation, which Collingwood refers to as cause in 
sense II, is at work in the practical sciences of nature but is on the other hand 
absent from purely theoretical sciences, such as physics, which ask a differ-
ent kind of why-question, questions which deploy a different conception of 
causation that Collingwood refers to as sense III. Explanations which appeal 
to causation in sense III appeal to laws which are exceptionless and which, 
unlike the generalizations at work in the practical sciences of nature, are not 
hedged by ceteris paribus clauses. To illustrate: the heat will cause (in sense II) 
the plants to die unless they are watered, or dehydration will cause (in sense II) 
a headache unless headache tablets are ingested. By contrast tidal currents are 
caused (in sense III) by gravitational forces: given the gravitational pull of the 
Moon, water will rise on Earth. The rising of the water is not conditional upon 
everything else being equal in the way in which the wilting of the plants is 
caused by the heat but is conditional upon their not being watered.
To satisfy the curiosity of the person who asks a question, the answer must 
be of the right kind, that is, it must match the “because” in the answer to the 
“why” in the question. Failure to do so, Collingwood claims, simply leaves the 
question unanswered:
If my car fails to climb up a steep hill, and I wonder why, I shall not con-
sider my problem solved by a passer-by who tells me that the top of the 
hill is farther away from the earth’s centre than its bottom, and that con-
sequently more power is needed to take the car uphill than to take her 
along the level … All this is quite true; what the passer-by has described 
is one of the conditions which together form … what I call the cause in 
sense III … But suppose an AA man comes along, opens the bonnet, holds 
up a loose high-tension lead and says: ‘Look here sir, you’re running on 
3   For an account of Collingwood’s conception of causation in the context of contemporary 
manipulability accounts of causation see Popa, E., “Collingwood and Manipulability-based 
Approaches to Causation: Methodological Issues”. Collingwood and British Idealism Studies 
22 /1 (2016), 139–166. Special issue on Collingwood and Philosophical Methodology guest ed-
ited by Giuseppina D’Oro and James Connelly.
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three cylinders’. My problem is now solved … If I had been a person who 
could flatten out hills by stamping on them the passer-by would have 
been right in calling to the hill as the cause of the stoppage; not because 
the hill was a hill, but because I was able to flatten it out.
EM, 302–3
There are, Collingwood claims, different senses of causation (or of explana-
tion) that are at work in history, in the practical, and in the theoretical sci-
ences of nature. These different senses of causation/explanation are fit to 
answer the kind of questions asked by historians, practical and theoretical 
scientists respectively. Just as the driver’s question in Collingwood’s example 
is not answered by the physicist’s consideration that the top of the hill is fur-
ther removed from the centre of the Earth than its base, so the curiosity of the 
historian who seeks an explanation for president Kennedy’s death will not be 
satisfied by consulting his medical file and discovering his death was caused 
by two bullets which fractured his cranium. For the historian, unlike the physi-
cian, is concerned with Kennedy’s death as an assassination, not as a biological 
phenomenon and to describe it as an assassination requires explaining it te-
leologically as a (goal-directed) action by appealing to what Collingwood calls 
“sense I” of causation. In the historical sense of causation (sense I) to explain 
is to supply a motive, not to subsume the explanandum under an empirical 
law. There is a reciprocal relation holding between the kind of explanation one 
uses (or the sense of causation that governs a form of inquiry) and the nature 
of one’s explanandum: method determines subject matter.
The reciprocal relation holding between method and subject matter entails 
that explanations of different forms or kinds do not compete because they are 
not meant as answers to the same why-questions. The claim that a) JFK died 
because of a fatal brain injury, and the claim that b) JFK died because he was 
the victim of a carefully orchestrated political conspiracy, do not compete in 
the way in which the claim that b) JFK was the victim of a political conspiracy 
and that c) JFK was the target of a lone killer, do: b) and c) answer the same 
question by providing different explanations of the same kind; a) and b) do 
not answer the same question. They are not just different explanations, they 
are rather explanations of a different kind. As such they have a different ex-
planandum. The upshot of Collingwood’s discussion of the different senses of 
causation is that there are different kinds of explanation which are invoked 
in different contexts of inquiry and answer differ kinds of why-questions. The 
divide between history as a science of mind and the natural sciences is a divide 
between the different kinds of because-answers they give to different kinds of 
why-questions.
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Both history and natural science presuppose a conception of explanation 
that gives rise to certain kinds of questions and determines what can count 
as an answer to their own kind of questions. Natural science is therefore not a 
purely descriptive/value-neutral form of inquiry because it can only discover 
what is knowable through its methods and it can only answer questions which 
require invoking a nomological conception of explanation. Collingwood is not 
alone in claiming that science is not a purely descriptive, value-neutral enqui-
ry. But his views that all forms of investigation are norm-governed and thus 
not purely descriptive or value-neutral should not be conflated with the claim 
that science is not value-neutral because scientific theories do not describe 
facts which are independent of the historical context in which the theories 
were developed. To understand Collingwood’s denial of the value-neutrality 
of natural science it may be useful to contrast his view that science is norm 
governed with a slightly different approach to the view that science is not a 
value-neutral activity. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Kuhn argued 
that scientific terms must be understood in the historical context of the theory 
in which they are embedded. In this sense, the meaning of scientific terms is 
not historically invariant. The term “Earth”, for example, changes its meaning 
in the transition from a Ptolemaic or geocentric conception to a Copernican or 
heliocentric conception of the universe.4 Kuhn’s denial of the value-neutrality 
of scientific facts implies a commitment to meaning variance over time. Since 
comparability across scientific paradigms presupposes semantic equivalence, 
and since meaning equivalence is precisely what is put into question by deny-
ing that the reference of scientific terms can be fixed independently of the 
historical context in which the theory was developed, Kuhn’s philosophy of 
science threatens the possibility of making meaningful comparisons between 
scientific paradigms and thus the very notion of scientific progress.
Collingwood’s denial of the value-neutrality of science is grounded in a 
commitment to explanatory pluralism rather than to historical relativism (or 
meaning variance over time and place). His claim is that since the goals of his-
tory are different from those of natural science, they are better served by dif-
ferent explanatory methods. His denial of the value-neutrality of science arises 
out of his conception of metaphysics as a science of absolute presuppositions, 
according to which the task of philosophical analysis is to make explicit the 
norms which govern explanations in different forms of inquiry. Metaphysics, 
he claims, is not an ontological enquiry into “pure being”, but a logical inquiry 
into the presuppositions which govern the special sciences. It is the failure to 
4   Kuhn, T., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago University Press, 1970). See 
pp. 148–149.
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see that all questions are governed by presuppositions (and that different kinds 
of why-questions are answered by different kinds of causal/becausal answers) 
that gives rise to the illusion that there is only one kind of knowledge, scientific 
knowledge. The task of metaphysics is to disentangle different senses of causa-
tion by showing that they rely on different kinds of inference which suit differ-
ent explanatory purposes. The methodological imperialism of natural science 
is based on the mistaken assumption that the sort of inferences which charac-
terise natural science are suited to answer the questions asked by historians. 
The task of metaphysics, understood as an enquiry into the presuppositions 
that govern explanation in different forms of inquiry, precisely is to prevent 
any one of the special sciences from gaining the explanatory upper hand and 
claiming for themselves the role of the ‘first’ or primary science traditionally 
reserved to metaphysics understood as an ontological enquiry into pure being. 
Collingwood argues that the original Latin sense of the word scientia (a body 
of knowledge with a distinctive method and subject matter), has given way to a 
much narrower conception of what knowledge is (knowledge that is achieved 
through the methods of natural science). In the original Latin sense of the term 
scientia, history is a science because it has a method and subject matter of its 
own. But as the presuppositions which govern natural science recede into the 
background, and knowledge comes to be identified with scientific knowledge 
in the narrow sense, natural science easily mistakes its explanandum for the 
object of metaphysics traditionally conceived: pure being. On Collingwood’s 
view, what natural science investigates is not nature in itself (as a replacement 
for the metaphysical study of pure being), but the explanandum characteris-
tic of its form of inquiry. Whilst scientists may think that their explanations 
capture real causal relations which hold between events independently of the 
investigative goals of their form of inquiry, what they really establish is inten-
sional/explanatory relations which hold between the explanans and the ex-
planandum characteristic of their form of knowledge.
Natural science, just like history, presupposes a conception of explanation 
that serves its investigative goals and is thus not a value-neutral activity, but 
Collingwood’s defence of the methodological autonomy of history with re-
spect to natural science derives from an argument for explanatory pluralism, 
not for historical relativism. All knowledge for Collingwood (in the broad sense 
of scientia) is relative to presuppositions, but this is not the same as saying that 
it is relative to time and place.5 History differs from natural science because 
historical knowing relies on a different set of presuppositions about what it 
means to provide an explanation. Collingwood’s critique of scientism is not 
5   See D’Oro, G., “The Myth of Collingwood’s Historicism”, Inquiry 53/6 (2010), 627–641.
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motivated by a desire to replace one “ism” with another by endorsing a form of 
historicism which denies science methodological autonomy as something dis-
tinct from history, as some readings of his work as historicist appear to imply. 
Collingwood clearly is an historicist if by “historicism” one means a commit-
ment to the methodological autonomy of history qua Geisteswissenschaft or 
science of the mind. Much of the work of W. H. Dray6 sought to establish that 
Collingwood’s work was a life-time effort to tease apart the rationalizing infer-
ences required to explain actions as expressions of thought from the inductive 
inferences required to explain events as law-like. But the claim that historical 
explanations are sui generis and irreducible to nomological explanations does 
not entail historical relativism or the view that knowledge is relative to time 
and place.
We have argued that Collingwood’s argument for methodological pluralism 
is part and parcel of a conception of metaphysics as a science of presuppo-
sitions whose task is to make explicit the norms or principles which govern 
explanation in different forms of inquiry. An important presupposition of his-
torical inquiry is that mind, unlike nature, is not uniform over time and place 
and that historians cannot presuppose that the agents whose actions they in-
vestigate hold the same belief system as they do. By contrast, a key presupposi-
tion of scientific explanation is that nature does not change relative to time 
and place, that water froze at 0°C in the middle ages just as it did in Victorian 
times. The principle of the uniformity of nature is a presupposition for the 
inductive generalizations on which empirical science rests. While historians 
must be open to the possibility that the object of their inquiry changes in ac-
cordance with time and place (and they would fail to do their job properly if 
they assumed that the belief system of feudal barons was the same as that of 
a twentieth century New Yorker), natural scientists must presuppose the very 
opposite, namely that the reality they investigate is unchanging. Neither of 
these claims, namely a) that reality changes, and b) that reality is unchanging, 
is an ontological claim concerning the nature of reality; both claims capture 
6   Dray, W. H., “Historical Understanding as Rethinking”, University of Toronto Quarterly 27 
(1958), 200–215; Dray, W. H., Laws and Explanation in History (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1957); Dray, W. H., “The Historical Explanation of Actions Reconsidered” in S. Hook (ed) 
Philosophy and History, (New York: New York University Press, 1963); Dray, W. H., Philosophy 
of History (London: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1964); Dray, W. H. (ed.) Philosophical Analysis and 
History (New York and London: Harper and Row, 1966); Dray, W. H., “R. G. Collingwood and 
the Understanding of Actions in History” in Perspectives on History (London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1980), 9–26; Dray, W. H., History as Re-enactment: R. G. Collingwood’s Idea of 
History (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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presuppositions which govern forms of inquiry. As such they belong to meta-
physics understood as a study of presuppositions rather than as the study of 
pure being.
The claim that “nature does not change”, understood as a presupposition 
which governs explanation in the natural sciences, should not be confused 
with a commitment to reference invariance of the kind found in the caus-
al theory of meaning as articulated in the works of Kripke7 and Putnam.8 
Reference invariance as defended by Putnam and Kripke has been invoked to 
counteract the view that since the meaning of scientific terms changes across 
paradigms, it is not possible to compare scientific theories which belong to dif-
ferent historical contexts.9 Natural science, for Collingwood, must presuppose 
reference invariance; it must presuppose that nature is uniform and thus that 
all scientific theories describe (in different ways) the same invariant object. 
But according to Collingwood, the commitment to the principle of the unifor-
mity of nature is a presupposition of scientific inquiry and as such a claim that 
belongs to metaphysics as a science of presuppositions. It is not a claim about 
the nature or essence of objects per se, but about how they must be thought of 
within a form of inquiry. Collingwood does claim that explanations in both his-
tory and the natural sciences are norm-governed and as such provide answers 
to questions that reflect the investigative goals of historians and natural sci-
entists respectively, rather than inquiry-independent truths. But his argument 
for the methodological autonomy of history with respect to natural science 
does not entail a topsy-turvy dissolution of science into history and the sub-
sequent replacement of one ism (as in historicism) with another (scientism). 
From a historical point of view nature is like a cultural artefact that must be 
understood in the context of thought, if it is to be understood historically. The 
history of the philosophy of science is an historical inquiry concerned with the 
idea of nature, how nature was conceptualized in different times and places, 
because the historian of science (just like historians in general) works under 
the presupposition that the context of thought is not unchanging. For the prac-
ticing scientist, on the other hand, nature is an invariant object and different 
scientific paradigms reflect not the historically changing idea of nature but 
progressively more sophisticated descriptions of an invariant reality investi-
gated under the presupposition of the uniformity of nature. Once the switch 
7   Kripke, S., Naming and Necessity, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980)
8   Putnam, H., Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1975).
9   On this see Kuukkanen, J.-M., “Meaning Change in the Context of Thomas S. Kuhn’s 
Philosophy”, (PhD Dissertation. University of Edinburgh, 2006).
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in presuppositions is properly recognized, there is no deep ontological conflict 
between the history of the philosophy of science and science itself, as there 
is indeed no conflict between science and history more generally. The failure 
to integrate science and the history of the philosophy of science (or science 
and history more generally) is thus rooted not in the fact that they imply in-
compatible ontologies, but in the fact that they are governed by incompatible 
presuppositions.10 Within a traditional conception of metaphysics one would 
have to choose between the scientific and the historical conception of reality 
since they could not both be true of an inquiry-independent reality or of pure 
being. Within Collingwood’s conception of metaphysics as uncovering the pre-
suppositions which govern different forms of inquiry the choice between the 
two is determined more pragmatically by the ability of any one of these ex-
planatory frameworks to answer the questions one is concerned with.
Collingwood’s explanatory pluralism denies both the view that history is 
reducible to natural science and its antithesis, i.e., the view that science is 
reducible to history (or to the history of science). His explanatory pluralism, 
therefore, does not give rise to the counter-intuitive implications that arise 
when science is dissolved into the history/sociology/anthropology of science. 
Latour11 for example rejected the claim that pharaoh Rameses II died of tu-
berculosis, on the grounds that the tubercle bacillus was not discovered until 
1882 and hence bacilli are not the sort of things that can be invoked to explain 
the pharaoh’s death or indeed any deaths prior to the arrival of microbiology.12 
The kind of explanatory pluralism endorsed by Collingwood does not give 
rise to the counter-intuitive claim that deaths pre and post 1882 have to be 
explained in a different way because there were no bacilli before 1882. What 
Collingwood’s explanatory pluralism would lead him to say is not that Koch’s 
bacilli cannot be invoked to explain why Rameses II died, but only that, when 
Rameses’ death is so explained, it is not explained historically. Much as an 
archaeologist who uses carbon dating techniques switches from historical to 
naturalistic explanations, so a historian who explains the pharaoh’s death by 
10   For the view that history and science rest on incompatible ontologies see Kuukkanen, J.-M., 
“Historicism and the Failure of HPS” in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science XXX 
(2015), 1–9.
11   Latour, B. (2000). On the partial existence of existing and non-existing objects. In 
L. Daston (ed.), Biographies of Scientific Objects (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2000), 247–269.
12   For a discussion of the counter-intuitive implications of dissolving science into the 
history of the philosophy of science see Tosh, N., “Science, Truth and History, part II. 
Metaphysical Bolt-holes for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?” Studies in History and 
Philosophy of Science 38 (2007), 185–209.
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citing bacilli that had not been discovered at the time of the ancient Egyptians 
has changed her explanatory hat and is now operating under the presupposi-
tion of the uniformity of nature. Philosophy takes note of the presuppositions 
which govern different forms of inquiry and in doing so it shows not only that 
history cannot be reduced to science but also that scientific enquiry cannot be 
reduced to a form of historical knowing. A historicism which denies science 
its autonomous domain of inquiry just is an inverted scientism.13 This is not 
what Collingwood would have wished for. But seeing why he would not have 
wanted to replace one ‘ism’ with another requires being very clear about his 
conception of the role of philosophical analysis in patrolling the borders be-
tween domains of inquiry.
Once the role of metaphysics in making explicit the presuppositions that 
govern forms of inquiry is clarified the goal of a philosophy of history, as 
Collingwood saw it, can be properly understood not as an attempt to recover 
the past in the way in which a natural scientist would be interested in knowing 
it, that is by retrodicting what had to happen in accordance to the most up-to-
date scientific knowledge, but as an attempt to view the world through the lens 
of the belief system of past agents as expressed in their actions. Collingwood 
is clear that when the fundamental presupposition which governs historical 
inquiry (that unlike nature, human nature changes from time to place) is dis-
regarded, the historian will fail to understand its subject matter historically, 
13   Unfortunately it is precisely this kind of historicism that Collingwood has been tradi-
tionally associated with. See for example: Rotenstreich, N., “Metaphysics and Historicism” 
in Krausz, M. (ed.), Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1972), 179–200; Toulmin, S., “Conceptual Change and the Problem 
of Relativity”, in Krausz, M. (ed.) Critical Essays on the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972); Donagan, A., The Later Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962); Harrison, R., “Atemporal Necessities of Thought; or, 
How Not to Bury Philosophy by History” in E. Schaper and W. Vossenkuhl (eds.) Reading 
Kant: New Perspectives on Transcendental Arguments and Critical Philosophy, (Oxford: 
Basil Blackwell, 1989), 43–54. For the opposite view see Connelly, J. “Metaphysics and 
Method: A Necessary Unity in the Philosophy of R. G. Collingwood”, Storia, Antropologia 
e Scienze del Linguaggio 5/1–2 (1990), 36–156; Modood, T., “The Later Collingwood’s 
Alleged Historicism and Relativism” in Journal of the History of Philosophy 27 (1989), 
101–125; Oldfield, A., “Metaphysics and History in Collingwood’s Thought” in D. Boucher, 
J. Connelly and T. Modood (eds.), Philosophy, History and Civilization: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives on R. G. Collingwood (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1995); D’Oro, G., 
Collingwood and the Metaphysics of Experience (London and New York: Routledge, 
2002); D’Oro, G., “The Myth of Collingwood’s Historicism”, Inquiry 53/6 (2010), 627–641; 
D’Oro, G., “History and Idealism: Collingwood and Oakeshott”, in The Routledge Companion 
to Hermeneutics, edited by Jeff Malpas, (Routledge, 2015), 191–204.
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because she will look at the past like a natural scientist. While the presupposi-
tion which governs natural science (the principle of the uniformity of nature) 
entails that scientific theories which belong to the history of the philosophy of 
science must be deemed to be false if they do not conform to current scientific 
knowledge, the presupposition which governs history (that human nature is 
subject to change) requires the historian to abstain from any such compari-
sons and interpret past actions in the light of the historical agents’ own be-
liefs. Collingwood’s account of re-enactment aims to show precisely how it is 
possible to view the world from the point of view of past agents by interpret-
ing their actions as expressions of their own epistemic, aesthetic and moral 
norms, rather than those of the historian. A cornerstone of his account of re-
enactment is that a historian can rethink the very same thoughts of historical 
agents from a very distant past, provided the historian immerses herself in the 
thought context of the agent.14 While Collingwood would not deny that there 
may be some value in writing historical narratives which look at the past from 
the perspective of the present, he explicitly rejected the view that this is how 
the historian inevitably or necessarily must look at the past. He argued that 
there is no barrier in principle to understanding the world as the Greeks or 
as the Romans did. The belief that this is a logical impossibility stems from 
the misidentification of the propositional content of thought with the token 
act of thinking which, unlike the content, is by its very nature, unique to the 
thinker.15 Re-enactment is clearly not a magic wand; the historian is fallible 
and misinterpretations can occur. Documents which were not previously avail-
able may be discovered at a later stage and cast a different light on the past. 
But while knowledge of the historical past may be hard to achieve, and while 
we may sometime only think we have achieved it, it is in principle achiev-
able. The fundamental message of Collingwood’s philosophy of history is that 
historical knowledge is possible, that the historian is not necessarily trapped 
within her own zeitgeist. What is required for such knowledge to be possible is 
a conscious attempt to read the actions of others from the perspectives of their 
own cultural norms. Understanding the past is therefore not fundamentally 
different from understanding other cultures which are contemporaneous with 
the historian. Collingwood’s account of re-enactment conveys a very positive 
message concerning the possibility of historical knowing, one which sharply 
contrasts with the kind of epistemic scepticism one finds in much postmodern 
philosophy of history.
14   For Collingwood’s account of re-enactment see IH, Epilegomena §4.
15   See D’Oro, G., “Collingwood on Re-enactment and the Identity of Thought”, Journal of the 
History of Philosophy, 38:1 (2000), 87–101.
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Once Collingwood’s philosophy of history is read as premised on the assump-
tion that there is a distinctive kind of non-nomological inference which is at 
work in historical explanations, it also becomes evident that Collingwood’s ar-
ticulation and defence of the Natur/Geisteswissenschaft distinction is unique. 
His account of historical understanding sets him apart both from neo-Kantians 
such as Windelband16 and Rickert,17 whose defence of the methodological au-
tonomy of the human sciences rests on a distinction between nomothetic and 
ideographic sciences, and from the hermeneutic tradition of Dilthey, which as-
sociated understanding in the human sciences with empathy.18 Historical un-
derstanding, for Collingwood, differs from scientific knowledge not because it 
is concerned with unique events, such as the French Revolution (which cannot 
be reproduced under laboratory conditions) but because historical explana-
tions establish rational rather than nomological connections. Since the ability 
to re-enact or rethink the thoughts of historical agents requires the ascription 
to the agent of a practical argument (which makes the action intelligible by 
showing it to be instrumentally conducive to the realization of certain ends), 
re-enactment does not require that the historian should identify with the agent 
in the sense of believing what the historical agents believed or desiring what 
the agents desired. Although Collingwood’s account of re-enactment has often 
been associated with the notion of empathetic understanding19 one finds in 
Dilthey and has, more recently, been hailed as a predecessor of simulation 
theory,20 such interpretations run against the grain of Collingwood’s claim that 
explaining actions requires rationalizing them. The latter claim shows that the 
historian would have no trouble understanding agents with whom she does 
not empathize since understanding does not require experiencing the agents’ 
desires (or believing as they did) but rather the ability to rationalize their ac-
tions by seeing them as conducive to the realizations of certain goals, which 
the historian need not share with the agent. It is not the historian’s wanting to 
16   Windelband, W. ‘Rectoral Address, Strasbourg, 1894’, History and Theory, 19/2 (1980), 
169–85.
17   Rickert, H. The Limits of Concept Formation in Natural Science, Translated by G. Oakes, 
(Cambridge University Press, 1986).
18   Dilthey, W. Selected Writings edited and introduced by H.P. Rickman, (Cambridge 
University Press, 1976).
19   For readings which resist the association of re-enactment with empathy see Saari, H. 
‘R. G. Collingwood on the Identity of Thought’, Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review 
28 (1989): 77–89 and van der Dussen, J. “The Philosophical Context of Collingwood’s Re-
enactment Theory”, International Studies in Philosophy, 27/2 (1995), 81–99.
20   Stueber, K., Rediscovering Empathy: Agency, Folk Psychology, and the Human Sciences. 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2006).
JPH_011_03_01-D'Oro.indd   287 9/26/17   2:57:34 PM
288 D’Oro and Connelly
journal of the philosophy of history 11 (2017) 275–288
φ that enables her to understand why an agent φed. While we do use the term 
“understand” in this way (I “understand” in this way why you want a cup of 
coffee because I so desperately want one myself), this is not how Collingwood 
thought of “understanding”.
The contributions in this special issue address and rectify certain rather 
prevalent interpretations of Collingwood that have tended to obscure how dis-
tinctive his contribution to the philosophy of history is. Jonas Ahlskog (R. G. 
Collingwood and the presence of the past) argues that Collingwood’s account 
of re-enactment rejects both the postmodern view that the past in-itself is ir-
retrievable because it is a projection from the present which is re-interpreted 
anew from different historical standpoints, and the criticism of this view more 
recently articulated by presence theorists who have defended the claim that 
it is possible to make contact with a pristine past by appealing to the idea of 
aesthetic intuition. Tyson Retz (Why Re-enactment is not empathy, once and 
for all) locates Collingwood’s account of re-enactment in the wider context of 
his metaphysics to undermine the standard identification of this doctrine with 
the psychologistic accounts of understanding typical of the post-Kantian her-
meneutic tradition, which looked to empathy as a distinctive methodology for 
the human sciences. Sophie Marcotte-Chenard (Is Collingwood a historicist? 
Remarks on Leo Strauss’s Critique of Collingwood’s Philosophy of History) de-
fends Collingwood’s philosophy of history from Strauss’ accusation of histori-
cism and argues that both philosophers defend the possibility of understanding 
past agents in their own terms and Timothy Lord (Collingwood, idealism, 
realism, and the possibility of historical knowledge) defends his philosophy 
of history from the accusation that Collingwood’s idealism leads to a form 
of historical constructivism that is indistinguishable from post-modernism. 
Parysa Clare Mostajir (Reading The Idea of History through The Principles of 
Art: Collingwood on Communication and Emotions) draws on The Principles 
of Art to develop an interpretation of Collingwood’s philosophy of history that 
does not exclude emotionally driven actions from its subject matter. Robert 
F. DeVall, Jr (Collingwood, Bradley, and Critical History) revisits Collingwood’s 
engagement with Bradley’s critical history and Stephen Leach (L. S. Klejn and 
R. G. Collingwood on History, Archaeology, and Detection) explores the rela-
tions between history and archaeology in Collingwood through a comparison 
with the Russian Archaeologist L. S. Klein. Finally, Christopher Fear (Was he 
right? R. G. Collingwood’s rapprochement between philosophy and history) ex-
plores the relationship between philosophy and the history of philosophy and 
how to juggle historical understanding with the question of truth.
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